



SPECIAL MOBILITY STRAND

PANIC AND MASS BEHAVIOR UNDER FIRE CASES ARTEMIS HASA NOVI SAD, 6.3.2019

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OUTLINE

- *Definition and interpretation of panic*
- *Panic on different perspectives*
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 - *Clinical issues*
 - *Social identity*
- *Research methods on mass psychology*
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- *Conclusion*
- *Future expectations*






Definition and interpretation of panic

- Panic defined by Goldenson: "reaction involving terror, confusion and irrational behaviour precipitated by a threatening situation."
- Haesler states that: panic is inevitable after a period of time while the crowd has reached a certain density and immobility.





What mass panic is ?

-  *'instincts' will overwhelm socialized responses*
-  *social norms will break down as personal survival becomes the overriding concern*
-  *selfish and competitive panic behavior, such as pushing and trampling others to reach safety*



Scientific evidence in mass panic

- *What is described as **panic** in fire cases is **not scientifically approved** and does not fit to the main concept of panic*
- *is a **disparity in the perspective of people** who use the concept of panic to judge the appropriateness of someone's behavior*



Panic on different perspectives

Media perspective

Dramatizing and exaggerating the cases while reporting

Journalists direct questions with a tendency to emphasize panic

Cinema effect

Dramatic mass panic scenes
Portraying hysterical behavior of people

Nourish wrong public imagination on fire cases

Individuals perspective

Using word panic while interviewing where only fear is evident and rational behaviour

Professionals & experts perspective

Fire engineers and firefighters have the tendency to attribute the fault of tragedies to panic



Is it really panic ?

- *Panic is **very rare occurring** or the case is **misinterpreted** and reported as panic*
- *People explain some situations of **stress/anxious/fearfulness** as panic while is only a normal reaction of a human behavior in cases of fire.*
- *Commonly confused with the **flight behavior** under certain circumstances*



Case studies

- ***Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire***, USA, May 28, 1977, 300 dead _ the blame on panic by media
- ***Stardust Nightclub Fire***, Ireland, February 13, 1981, 48 killed and over 200 injured, the fault _ panic
- ***Gothenburg Discotheque Fire***, Sweden, October 29, 1998, 63 killed and more than 200 injured, overloaded with people _ panic
- ***World Trade Center Attack***, USA, September 11, 2001
- ***Lowenbrawkeller***, Germany, April 12, 1973, 11 died and 250 injured, stacked to one of the entrances _ panic



Source: www.geocaching.com





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Next week
in
**THE IRISH
TIMES**

**A question
of neutrality**



**Assessing
property**



**Dr. Doyle's
Carrick**




**Garda
urge
use of
death
penalty**

**At least 40
dead in fire
in Dublin club**

At least 40 dead in fire in Dublin club



WIDE-SCALE REPORTAGE
A fire in a Dublin club has killed at least 40 people and injured many others. The fire broke out in the early hours of the morning and spread rapidly through the building. The cause of the fire is still under investigation. The fire is the deadliest in the history of the club. The fire is the deadliest in the history of the club. The fire is the deadliest in the history of the club.



Sources:
www.irishtimes.com
www.independent.ie



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Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>
<http://crimescenedb.com>

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Sources: www.cunesower.com
www.securitydegreehub.com
www.thoughtco.com



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Misconception of panic in scientific research ?

Until 70's literature and scientific research



Blame on panic



no further development can be achieved

● *Philips refuses the research in people behavior in fire considering it very abstract to be understood.*

● *Small group of researchers* → *scientific explanation*

The effects of misinterpretation of panic

- *Philips considers the panic a **greater cause of death** than the fire itself*
- ***Codes and regulations has changed** by considering the **panic as the main inducer** of the tragedies and disasters of fire*
- *Institutions have tried to deal mostly with panic and how to manage it rather **understanding the psychological behavior** of humans under fire cases*

The effects of misinterpretation of panic

- While ***blaming the panic*** for fire case tragedies ***less importance and attention is provided to fire management and building standards***
- ***Less information is provided to people*** due to consideration of the behavior of the mass during fire as irrational and illogical
- The misconception of panic has ***delayed further investigation and research in fire***

The effects of misinterpretation of panic

- *the tendency to cover people with **non human features** and exhibit further their emotional aspects **reduces the focus in the control of fire in its early stages, the layout of the building and thinking for particular options.***
- *While limiting information to people because it induces panic may be a fatality because the awareness to potential dangers is delayed (**time is very precious**)*

From panic to mass psychology _ evacuation factors

1. A mass of people







2. Threat of death

3. Escape possibilities





Human factors

-  *the effectiveness of emergency procedures*
-  *the behavior of the evacuating crowd, which has often been blamed for panic, disorganized, over-emotional, irrational and ineffective egress*
-  *decision-making and the interpretation of events*
-  *leadership and social influence*



Evacuation _ Decision making

- *Seriousness of threat and urgency of situation influence rapidity of response;*
- ***people often assume that the equipment is simply being tested, it is a malfunction or just a drill***
- *Mechanism of warning affects the interpretation of the event.*
- ***people often do not recognize the emergency or act quickly enough***



Evacuation _ Clinical issues

- *Freezing*

- ***potentially dangerous as it can prevent appropriately urgent flight action***

- *Becoming disassociated or psychologically distanced from the reality*

- ***behave with more calmness than is needed***




Evacuation _ Social identity

Psychological crowd	Aggregated crowd
Greater concern towards others in the crowd (including strangers)	No concern at all
co-ordination, help and personal self-sacrifices (including strangers)	segregation
expectations of support	No support
fewer personally selfish or competitive behaviors.	individuality





Research methods for mass psychology

-  ***Room Evacuation modelling***
-  ***Visualization studies***
-  ***Field interviews***

Room evacuation modelling

- *participants often did not take the scenario seriously enough*
- *the evacuation was over too quickly to give people an opportunity to display selfish versus helping behaviors*
- *by cramming them into a small room together, people saw themselves as a group in relation to experimenters*

FAILED



Visualization studies

- *when people saw themselves as group members, they helped more, cared for others more and expressed a greater desire to help*
- *where there is a strong sense of collective identity, there will be mutual concern and helping*
- *with a strong shared identity characters tended to help the fallen character even though this meant delaying their own exit*



Interviews on past cases

WITNESSES SHOWED THAT

- *in almost all cases, the crowd was more unified over the course of the emergency*
- *social roles continued to operate – for example teachers continued to act with authority in relation to the schoolchildren in their charge*
- *many people stayed with their small affiliation groups and gave more assistance to their affiliates than to others*

Interviews on past cases

WITNESSES SHOWED THAT


- *There was no mass panic*
- *individual feelings of fear of distress, people screaming or crying and did not spread to others*
- *no widespread uncontrolled, competitive, irrational and personally selfish behavior*
- *Causes of unity: Shared fate.*
- *Effects of unity: Mutual concern and helping*

Conclusions

1. Studies into fire disasters consistently find that **altruistic behavior is the norm**.
2. Management should consider the **people as ally** to help in evacuation rather than irrational mass.
3. **Information is the key** to a successful building evacuation during an emergency. (proper info in the right way at the right time)
4. The **media plays a key role** on reduction of panic impression

Expectation for further improvements

- *There is a **need for identification of factors which lead to panic** and measuring its level and how to overcome it.*
- *Need for **demystification** of panic concept.*
- *Much effort should be made in **developing computer models** for evacuation simulations and design properly the space in accordance with evacuation standards.*



Thank you
for your attention

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Knowledge FOR Resilient soCiEty

Is the media a factor affecting the perception of panic in fire cases?

Is misinterpretation of panic affecting fire and regulation codes?

Is social identity contributing on mass behavior for reducing the disaster consequences?

Does the virtual modelling software help on crowd prediction under fire case circumstances?

Does the crowd to be evacuated need to have information related with the fire situation or it has to be prevented from the information in order to help the evacuation process ?